But no one can make his way into a strong man's house and plunder his property unless he has first tied up the strong man.
INTRODUCTION
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz once observed that "[a]t the political center of any complexly organized society . . . there is both a governing elite and set of symbolic forms expressing the fact that it is in truth governing." 2 In the spirit of Geertz's remark, I endeavor to capture the subtle, inventive, and selfretrenching ways in which the Supreme Court employs language to signal how we ought to think about its authority. Now that the Rehnquist Court has reshaped the constitutional topography in earnest, we would do well to examine its rhetorical legacy as scrupulously as its substantive record.
At this stage, the project I sketch is more archaeological than medical, its principal task one of excavation rather than diagnosis. As legal semioticians and language philosophers have documented, the art of argumentation consists of making accepted moves and countermoves, in addition to invoking recurring "categories of social perception" 3 or "frames of understanding."
By resorting to such techniques, the Court as an institution conveys the need for and the ultimate meaning of its interpretative acts. These language devices resonate with us because of pre-existing cognitive ideals that shape how we see, feel, and speak about constitutional law and state authority. The language compositions cause us to sense disruption and uncertainty, to desire stability and harmony, and to demand psychological relief. Even when they do not form an explicit component of legal argumentation, warring incandescent conceptions of the interpretive process propel the persuasive endeavor just below the surface of constitutional discourse.
II FREE EXPRESSION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO INSTITUTIONAL STATURE
A. Cultural Consensus A great deal of critical commentary has emerged on the Supreme Court's steady advancement of the new federalism agenda. 8 Of the Court's recent rulings implementing this program, Cass Sunstein has described the Justices as "far too sure they are right, [and] . . . too free [in] reject [ing] the judgment of other branches of government." 9 Yet we often miss these traits when they manifest in the arena of free speech. A more exacting evaluation is warranted.
One reason to pore over these decisions anew is because free expression says something about us as scholars and citizens. Cultural acceptance of protective speech norms has fed tolerance of legal language that would be deemed troubling in other areas of the law.
Popular support for freedom of speech remains high, even though Americans might disagree about its application in discrete situations and notwithstanding fluctuations due to persistent controversies as well as sudden exigencies. In a recent study on public perception of the First Amendment, 75% of respondents considered the ability to speak freely as "essential," while 94% supported the right to express unpopular opinions. 10 The right to free speech remains the most cherished and recognizable right, with six in ten Americans correctly locating the speech right in the First Amendment. No other constitutional right is identified by more than one in every five people surveyed. Little wonder, then, that jurists are tempted to turn to the First Amendment to enhance the stature of the institution to which they belong. It is a patois spoken by most Americans, and decisionmakers can afford to be assertive in their writings on speech without provoking a sustained outcry. Dominant scholarly accounts have indirectly exacerbated our collective sufferance of loose free speech language. Leading theories of constitutional process are drawn from a narrow class of equal protection and substantive due process cases in the canon; the First Amendment rarely if ever enters the narrative.
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Instead, the First Amendment is left to its own realm and to its own caretakers.
12 Besides John Hart Ely and Cass Sunstein, 13 few legal thinkers have bothered with projects of integration.
Academic separation and sub-specialization thus have had the perverse effect of tempering deep reconsideration of First Amendment foundations and cultural trends, while impoverishing constitutional meta-theory. Does a theory of constitutional law have sufficient explanatory power if it fails to engage the developments in this ever burgeoning area?
What is more, because modern theorists focus on constitutional decisionmaking rather than law-explaining, they tend to elevate doctrine or ideology over rhetorical technique and institutional personality.
14 But creeping legal rhetoric-whether a product of clever arrangement or careless opinionwriting-should always be of concern.
B. Doctrinal Expansiveness
Another cause for a rigorous reappraisal is that the other dimensions of constitutional life have become islands in a veritable sea of First Amendment law. The sheer amount of judicial activity in the law of free expression is simply breathtaking. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that the Supreme Court's linguistic record in this arena is more reflective of its modern selfconception than its federalism decisions. It is easy to forget that even as the Court has struck down a handful of congressional enactments on the basis of federalism principles (path-breaking decisions in their own right), it has invoked the First Amendment in an even more sustained and vigorous manner to regulate social boundaries. Between the years 1986 and 2002, the Court decided approximately 108 free expression cases.
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And the influence of free speech culture extends well beyond the cases in which laws actually are invalidated: each spring, the Court methodically fills its docket with headline-generating speech controversies, thereby building suspense with its national audience before taking center stage in the fall. Thus, there are unexplored connections between a strong cultural support for free speech and the institution's broader agenda.
In demonstrating an unshakable commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate, 16 the Justices have fashioned a legal regime in which nearly everything is speech and nearly all speech is fully protected-with the Judiciary poised at the fulcrum of cultural power. 17 This process, which began in earnest after World War II, generated considerable momentum during the final decades of the Twentieth Century. Even Chief Justice William Rehnquist in recent years has "surprised observers by concurring in expansive free speech opinions in areas where he had once dissented. We do not merely expect this to occur; we enthusiastically accept this state of affairs. Never mind whether the courts alone can guarantee liberty over time or whether a juricentric ethos might disable other institutions and foster cultural complacency. It is a truism of contemporary American life that vigorous affirmation of the First Amendment is a basic condition of freedom.
It is often the case, though not invariably so, that doctrinal breadth and rhetorical innovation go hand in hand. For this reason, the area promises to be fertile ground for the study of legal language.
Of course, to criticize contemporary methods of argumentation is not to suggest that a robust Speech Clause is not vital to our constitutional order. Rather, the point is simply that the Justices are intensely aware that the First Amendment represents one of their richest stores of cultural capital, and they go to some lengths to ensure that the cupboard is never bare.
III LANGUAGE, MOTIVATION, AND COGNITION

A. The Forms of Constitutional Discourse
The richness of First Amendment law presents opportunities to consider the Court's resourceful use of language to promote both cultural acceptance of its decisions and its ability to navigate social domains. Cognitive theory sharpens our sense of how judicial actors manipulate language to make interpretive authority comprehensible.
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A better appreciation of these linguistic innovations also helps us to see why the Court as an institution-a social organization with its own deeply ingrained practices-resorts to certain rhetorical strategies.
As linguists and psychologists have explained, human beings instinctively sort perceptual and experiential data into useful clusters of information to make sense of the world. 21 On this view, categorization is a natural phenomenon, and legal categorization is a highly developed, ritualized subset of this process. We are, in a word, "hunter-categorizers." 22. This clever phrase, for which I thank Keith Aoki, captures this synthesis of the unavoidable nature and the artificial quality of categorization.
"Frames of understanding" are the mental constructs we use to organize our experience, knowledge, perceptions, and sensations. They are what give legal terms color and bite. Ideas have significance for us-they have a hold on usbecause of what is conjured in our collective minds. Although frames operate on the instinctive level, orators can purposefully employ language and visual cues to trigger preferred frames of understanding.
These general observations about ordinary language require some refinement when it comes to constitutional language. First, as a quasi-political actor, the Court actively tends to the boundaries of its own sphere and from time to time presumes to speak for the entire constitutional order. Thus, the Court constantly characterizes the constitutional process and defends its role within it. This bureaucratic imperative to engage in self-preservation or expansion, doctrinal tinkering or ideological advancement, infuses not only case selection and adjudication, but also language tactics. 23 Second, in employing language instrumentally, the Supreme Court perpetuates conceptions of social life-not only building and populating our world, but also influencing how we should think and feel about our experiences. These constitutive and emotive qualities of constitutional language shape how we appreciate state authority. In this respect, judicial power, like the evanescent nature of political influence, is made concrete through cycles of rhetorical assertion, reinforcement, and acceptance or resistance.
Third, law privileges existing rhetorical forms-the older, the better. The moves made during one controversy create templates for future moves. Whether they are used to reinforce existing doctrine or to strike out in new directions, these conversational modalities promise a degree of continuity and intelligibility.
B. Conversational Tools
The judicial toolkit is comprised of (1) explicit or formal modes of persuasion, such as propositional argumentation and storytelling, as well as (2) shortcuts that invoke often less rigid structures of meaning, such as recurring frames of understanding, scripts, metaphors, roles, and idealized cognitive models of social reality. Therefore, every legal contest unfolds in two arenas simultaneously, manifesting in doctrinal in-fighting and warring symbolic systems.
23. This emphasis on organization and cognition dovetails with the work of a number of scholars working within the "new institutionalist" tradition. As Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton explain, this approach "tends to focus on modes and forms of justification and legitimization as a driving force behind judicial activity. In this sense, legitimization is viewed as an organizational imperative for courts, serving both as a source of judicial inertia and a requirement for justification of particular judicial decisions and practices. Justification in turn compels courts to be highly sensitive and adaptive" toward their tasks. GILLMAN & CLAYTON, supra note 15, at 4.
Just as we can identify the set of accepted legal arguments (Philip Bobbitt has ably provided this service), 24 we can classify these other instruments of meaning and discern their primary characteristics: A handful of interpretive frames are particularly effective in maintaining the social legitimacy of the Supreme Court. I call these institution-building language compositions frames of judicial power. When activated by a potent metaphor, lyrical phrase, or well-timed reference to a seminal decision, a given frame of judicial power organizes the relevant experiential details and invites us to envision the exercise of interpretive power through the proffered lens. But this type of vehicle does something more than provide an ordinary frame of un- 25. Legal analysis is a specialized type of propositional argumentation. It flows from premise to conclusion in building-block fashion (for example, if A, then B). Argumentation is expected to involve transparent analysis, follow the rules of logic, remain susceptible to criticism, and consist of turn-taking. Persuasiveness is measured by fidelity to the facts as we know them and to the accepted sources of law.
derstanding: it urges us to internalize the Judiciary's interpretive prerogative, sometimes subtly, at other times with great urgency.
For the psychologist or cognitive linguist, a script is another kind of language tool, a "structure that describes appropriate sequences of events in a particular context."
26 It, too, is a mechanism that allows citizens to process events through shortcuts. When a script is initiated by a constitutional speaker, a listener immediately visualizes the details of a recurring social phenomenon, along with a chronology and a set of roles that each party customarily plays, 27 even if none of these facts is mentioned by the speaker. A wide range of scripts runs through legal decisions, helping us to make sense of constitutional law and, by extension, the socio-legal world that we inhabit. Some scripts are innocuous and essential; others have taken on a pathological quality. 28 Each formal method of persuasion might be said to have an informal analogue. Legal arguments and frames alike impose form upon experience in order to generate meaning. Whereas doctrine and precedent roam the surface of the legal realm, symbols and metaphors frolic in the constitutional demi-monde. Narrative consists of the personal details of a specific controversy set upon, or conforming to, the skeleton of a culturally available script, though both concepts imply a chronological dimension to their design. And whereas an official narrative treats participants to the lawsuit as legal parties, a script prescribes other kinds of performative roles to be filled by constitutional actors as the interpretive act is translated from mind to mind.
Once engaged, informal language structures operate at a level different than logic or even storytelling. The devices are purposeful and systemized in that the writer or speaker intentionally selects the triggers, or "script headers," and has some indication as to the cognitive reactions these devices might produce.
29 But these rhetorical moves engage the mind in a different manner than their more explicit cousins. While explicit modalities are coherent, rational, and timeintensive, these devices are incomplete, imaginative, and instantaneous. incrementalism, framing, scripting, and casting facilitate more concealed and free-wheeling forms of discourse.
Indeed, the symbolic forms of communicating state authority go beyond the formal, external trappings that students of culture and legal grammarians have identified, and they are more highly adaptive than many believe. 30 The "stories, ceremonies, insignia, formalities, and appurtenances" that permeate constitutional language certainly drink deeply from ancient cultural wellsprings, but the modalities themselves take root, often developing new shape and momentum, like a legend with each fresh telling.
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Despite differences in the form and properties of these language devices, when they are deployed we instantly grasp why an institution acts and we are moved to accept the exercise of legalized force over our lives. There is nothing, of course, deterministic about this-we can reject the meaning held out to us just as surely as we can allow it to infuse our very thoughts and actions. Whatever the long-term outcome, the basic point remains: The frames of judicial authority are undeniably powerful engines for creating and reinforcing conceptions of bureaucratic influence. Emphasizing deep structure, Geertz wrote that the symbolics of power were invented in "revolutionary situations," but were otherwise culturally inherited and maintained. GEERTZ, supra note 2, at 124.
31. See GEERTZ, supra note 2, at 124. 32. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 156-57 (stating that metaphors create realities and can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies).
33. "Tiān-Dì" is pin-yin for the Chinese phrase "heaven and earth," which, roughly translated, means "everything under the sun" or the "entire universe. A more remarkable development is that cries to rally around the First Amendment are no longer the exclusive province of judicial liberals. The very jurists who promote strict adherence to text or to the Framers' original intentions have not quietly followed; they have often led the charge.
The Free Speech Coalition case, 40 yet another that disintegrated into multiple opinions, 41 represents one such instance. In the course of invalidating a federal law prohibiting the possession or distribution of virtual child pornography, 42 the Justices endorsed a startlingly broad rationale: "The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought."
43
At first blush, one might mistake these words for the rather uncontroversial point that language acquisition and thought formation are interlaced, but a moment's reflection enables us to realize that the High Court is after much bigger game. Working backward from the end state of "freedom," Anthony Ken- nedy's opinion maps the legal, political, and cognitive dimensions of liberty onto a single causal chain. In this teleological narrative, the right of free speech is described as the original source of the American way of life (speech ! thought ! freedom). Meanwhile, the Court has squarely interposed itself as the "protect[or]" of not simply governmental arrangements but the entirety of human activity: thought, emotion, utterance, and interaction. Like every effort to trace the genesis of a social phenomenon, the passage enlists respect for tradition and lineage in its cause. There is even a biblical ring to this story of origins-the Court begets speech, which begets thought, which begets liberty. 44 Quite simply, the Court has become adept at calling upon a cultural image of itself as the defender of the full range of human possibilities.
A careful reader might recognize this passage as a riff on the well-turned principle that the First Amendment protects the sanctity of "thought and expression." 45 But its incarnation here actually shares more with the privacybased language in the plurality opinion in Casey, 46 which proclaimed that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 47 These words prefigure the Court's inspiring and-if at all possible-its more expansive formulation of liberty in Lawrence v. Texas:
48 "Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions." 49 The rhetoric of the modern Court, like its self-image, knows few bounds.
Equally conspicuous, the Court that rendered Free Speech Coalition warned that blockbuster movies such as Traffic and American Beauty could be outlawed because they contained images of underage teens appearing to engage in sexual activity. 50 The opinion's reference to two hit films is noteworthy because it represented an appeal to popular culture as a way of deflecting accusations that the Court was trying to shield child pornographers. 51 The Justices' broad language was especially striking because they eschewed an equally satisfactory alternative to striking down the challenged law. Interpreting the statute narrowly so as to exclude all artistic renderings except those which are "virtually indistinguishable from real children" 55 would have dramatically reduced the potential for mischief. 56 The Justices blithely rejected this minimalist solution to avoiding the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions.
If the Free Speech Coalition decision emitted a low-level pulse of disrespect toward Congress, disdain blossomed into full-blown antipathy in Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, where the Court invalidated advocacy restrictions on publicly funded legal services lawyers. 57 In that case, the Justices ruled that the law that prevented lawyers for the poor from lodging constitutional challenges to existing welfare laws was not a proper funding restriction but crossed the line into viewpoint discrimination. 58 However one feels about the decision on the merits, 59 it is impossible to miss the fervor with which the Court assailed the actions of a co-equal institution. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy excoriated Congress for invading "the sphere of its authority to resolve a case or controversy." 60 tively dripping with contempt, the opinion accused Congress of attempting to "wrest the law from the Constitution which is its source."
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At worst, this bordered on an ad hominem attack on a co-equal institution. At best, it amounted to an ungenerous characterization of Congress' motives, given that Rust v. Sullivan 62 provided legislators with a plausible basis for believing they had great latitude in drawing the contours of funding programs, even if doing so inhibited some measure of expression.
The Rehnquist Court's propensity to castigate another branch of government was again on full display in Dale. 63 This time, the highest court in the State of New Jersey served as the Court's ceremonial whipping boy. Substantively, the Court held that the Boy Scouts enjoyed a right of expressive association to exclude James Dale, a gay Scoutmaster.
64 And yet the most astonishing feature of the ruling was not so much its broadening of the right of expressive association, 65 but the palpable scorn directed at the New Jersey Supreme Court for daring to apply a civil rights law to the Boy Scouts in the first place. 66 Authored by the Chief Justice, the opinion called the statute "extremely broad" and blasted the state high court for applying the law "to a private entity without even attempting to tie the term 'place' to a physical location" and for extending the notion of public accommodations from "clearly commercial entities" to membership organizations.
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In short, the Court painted a mental picture of a state high court gone wild. To be sure, some amount of disagreement is necessary to give rise to a legal question in the first place, but the level of hostility exhibited in this decision was both extraordinary and unnecessary. Because the Justices were required to defer to the state court's conclusion that the Boy Scouts were covered by state law, there was no need to waste a single moment on this point. Moreover, it was entirely irrelevant to the constitutional question before the Court how other state courts had construed their public accommodation statutes. 68 This verbal mistreatment of the state institution that authoritatively interpreted state law foreshadowed the appearance of similarly contemptuous language in Bush v. Gore, 69 decided the very next term. There, the High Court impugned the motives of the Florida Supreme Court, declaring that its recount decisions "ratified the uneven treatment" 70 of ballots and failed to provide even "rudimentary requirements of equal protection and fundamental fairness."
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Three of the Justices-Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas-were convinced that the Florida Supreme Court's ruling was so "beyond what a fair reading" 72 of state law provided that they wrote separately to say that the state court usurped the role of state legislatures in prescribing how presidential electors are to be selected.
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Now contrast this inflammatory language in these two cases with the deferential words of an earlier era: "[T]his court will always feel itself bound to respect the decisions of the State courts, and from the time they are made will regard them as conclusive in all cases upon the construction of their own constitution and laws." 74 Again, in a decision the Supreme Court rendered as recently as 1981 the Justices stated: "This Court will defer to the interpretation of state law announced by the highest court of a State even where a more reasonable interpretation is apparent, a contrary construction might save a state statute from constitutional invalidity, or it appears that the state court has attributed an unusually inflexible command to its legislature." 75 Suffice it to say that Dale, like so many other opinions in the speech context, is reflective of the contemporary Court's character: The Court behaves as if it is all-knowing and all-seeing; and it not only rules, it freely rebukes.
On one level, this institutional personality is pronounced, even alarming. On another, this verbal daring underscores the ancient linkage between bureaucratic motivation and language strategy. The Court has always made use of whatever devices were at its disposal to safeguard its sphere of influence. Brevity and obscurity, for example, have been fixtures of the Court's rhetorical tradition for as long as clarity and cogency. 76 What we are seeing today is an insti-tution that has grown comfortable in reaching deep into its rhetorical arsenal to accomplish its objectives. Two recent cases-one on cross-burning, the other on campaign finance reform-strike a decidedly deferential tone even as they signal a shift in substance. But it remains to be seen whether these rulings augur a sustained shift in attitude or instead represent isolated nods to collegiality on two highly controversial subjects.
B. The Frame of Institutional Discord
There exist a number of less formal language techniques forceful in sending cognitive signals about the cultural role of the Supreme Court. Chief among them is the frame of institutional discord. This is a trans-substantive language composition, crossing over doctrinal lines and subject matter boundaries. Lately, it has become a favored conversational tool of a Court that is intensely occupied with redrawing existing lines of constitutional authority.
Recall the Dale opinion. On the surface, the Court argued that the Boy Scouts' right of expressive association had been impaired by the state law requiring Dale to remain in their midst, citing helpful case law like Hurley 78 and distinguishing seemingly contrary decisions. 79 At the level of the explicit, we are confronted by cogent factual narrative, defensible doctrinal analysis, and an aesthetically attractive configuration of precedent. Whether one is inclined to embrace or to repudiate the outcome, there can be little doubt that the decision adhered to the customary rules of engagement. Now consider anew the Court's move to enlist an image of the state supreme court run amok. This was not simply a colorful flourish, but the purposeful invocation of a frame of judicial power through the use of a metaphor with exceptionally powerful institutional significance. The opinion writers initiated a conversation about bureaucratic prerogative in which institutional friction is raised as a way of legitimizing, and even expanding, the Court's sphere of influence. In this popular form, social disharmony appears as the frightening image of organizational disarray or warring judicial power sources threatening to rend the very fabric of self-government.
But conflict-filled imagery is more than just a one-for-one representation of reality; it is more than a way of understanding one concept by reference to an-other. It also serves as a method of promoting acceptance of judicial authority by constructing psychological tension and promptly restoring well-being. 80 In raising the terrible image of irreconcilable conflict between state law and federal constitutional authority in Dale, as they later did in Bush v. Gore, 81 the Justices laid the groundwork for their intervention to restore equilibrium. Through this technique, blame for the exercise of judicial review was laid instantly at the foot of the state supreme institution rather than the High Court. The wayward state court forced our hand, the Court signaled, sidestepping the fact that state legislators wrote the law and for this reason might be owed some measure of respect. Thus, the order-disorder theme played out in the ruling had a one-two punch: It unsettled the actions of another constitutional actor while it simultaneously affirmed the legal-cultural role of the Supreme Court.
Expansiveness of state law, not constitutional innovation, became the touchstone. As used in this decision, the frame of judicial power deflected attention from the ever-extending nature of the First Amendment and the gloss put on earlier cases that had set crucial limits on the right of expressive association when other important interests were at stake. 82 These boundaries are essential not for their own sake, but because they encourage the political branches at all levels of government to experiment in rights creation and to take their constitutional roles seriously. In Dale, however, the lines were problematically redrawn, and these incentives diminished. 83 Through a dialectic of order-disorder, the Court thus communicates a desired conception of judicial authority. Creating a facsimile of conflict is effective because we instinctively worry more that the apparent crisis is resolved than about who takes care of the mess. We want the fire put out now, our mental tension ameliorated, and any questions to be asked later. Occasionally, the fire-danger link is made explicit, as in Reno v. ACLU, 84 where the Court explained that the Communications Decency Act "threaten[ed] to torch a large segment of the Internet community." 85 When this frame is engaged, we fear the imagined destruction of our social and political institutions. Indeed, they dissolve before our very eyes. Crisis, moreover, demands and justifies an equal measure of imagined legalized force to meet the psychological danger. Hence, this frame of understanding, or "experiential gestalt," 86 triggered by the opinion writers accomplishes two objectives. It conveys the meaning of judicial authority by appealing to historically driven concerns of social disarray, and it frequently does so by subordinating other pressing questions, including those of institutional competence.
Notice the subterranean script at work: the constitutional status-quo is disturbed, a hostile force must then be put down, the Supreme Court rises up to meet the challenge, and the interpretive act eventually restores psychic calm. 87 The narrative details vary depending on the circumstances and legal questions at issue, but the underlying script structure remains the same. It can be mapped in the following manner:
The conversational structure takes as its baseline the conventional wisdom that the interpretive act is intrusive, and thus must be justified by extraordinary circumstances. Indeed, it works precisely because these entrenched assumptions exist. The stock script soothes us by bolstering both the need for and the effectiveness of the assertion of institutional influence.
A similar conversation about judicial power was operationalized in the Velazquez decision, which upbraided Congress for encroaching on the Court's arena of influence. The Justices conjured up the titanic image of clashing federal institutions, which threatened the harmonious mental picture of tripartite balance and the comforting ideal of evenhanded justice. 88 Observe, too, the roles into which each constitutional actor was cast. In Dale, the Justices cast the state supreme court in the role of the illegitimate aggressor whose expansion of "traditional" anti-discrimination law disturbed the 86. The preferred terminology of Lakoff and Johnson differs from Fillmore's concept of linguistic "frames", but they all view "gestalts" or "frames" as ways of "organizing experiences into structured wholes." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 81. They identify six features of these multidimensional language structures: (1) participants; (2) parts; (3) stages; (4) a linear sequence; (5) causation; and (6) purpose. See id at 82.
87. Steven Winter describes this process as invoking the "Balance" and "Source-Path-Goal" image-schemas, by which the reader is taken from an initial state of harmony, through conflict and transformation, to a final state of restoration. See WINTER, supra note 19, at 109-10. This structure builds on the extended metaphor that "An Argument Is A Journey." LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 89-96. This skeletal structure makes possible language techniques like legal argumentation, storytelling, and myth-making. I have adapted Winter's general script structure of legal opinions to account for the unique rhythm of the frame of institutional conflict that we see over and over again in the constitutional domain.
88. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) .
constitutional order and threatened the liberty of us all. 89 The state court dared to act out of step with other, wiser courts by refusing a location-specific understanding of the term "public accommodation." In Velazquez, the twist was that Congress presented an omnipresent threat to our sense of equilibrium by distorting the usual functioning of the legal system and unraveling the concept of equal treatment before the law.
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Judicial reinvention plays an essential feature of this psychic drama, for "the judge in American culture plays a charismatic role in that she appeals to first principles and equity, raises up the oppressed, and restores the just and natural order of things." 91 The Court in each case assumed a fictive identity to fulfill this performative aspect of judging. In Dale, it assumed the persona of the defender of "political and cultural diversity" 92 and "reason" itself, 93 called into action to remedy the "severe intrusion" into our collective liberty. 94 Somewhat surprisingly, the "oppressed" was not the gay scout, but the Boy Scouts of America, a vast, wealthy, and influential organization!
The Velazquez Court inhabited a closely related role, galloping to the rescue of the indigent. In our mind's eye, we see the Court as the reluctant warrior, the defender of the realm. 95 Once the rebellion is put down or the fire extinguished, the heroic Court sheds its alter-ego, blends back into the background, and returns to its less fearsome, pre-crisis state.
C. Binding the Strong Man
Informal rhetorical practices, like their more formal counterparts, are efficacious because they revolve around enduring archetypes, what linguists describe as "idealized cognitive models." 96 According to George Lakoff, idealized models "involve oversimplifications, and often, metaphorical understandings and theories of reality." 97 Concepts radiate outward in every direction from a cognitive ideal; all we must do is follow the lines back to uncover the hidden 89. The opinion appeals to a fixed, "traditional" ideal of public accommodation law by suggesting that the state supreme court's interpretation departs from state public accommodations laws that "were originally enacted to prevent discrimination in traditional places of public accommodation-like inns and trains. ideal exerting a gravitational pull on our legal language, along with its supporting conversational latticework. 98 Take an image that is abundant in our expert and popular understandings of the Judiciary, one that colors much of our thinking about the proper role of the Court. On the ideal form of government, Montesquieu famously opined that "of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to nothing." 99 In the throes of political mobilization over the ratification of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton seized upon this image and forever planted the concept of the hopelessly weak judiciary into our constitutional lexicon. 100 In proper working form, the citizenry was told, the Court is "steady, upright, and impartial."
101 It exhibits neither passion nor will but judgment, resolves legal disputes, not political controversies, 102 and enforces self-evident rules derived from the Constitution. 103 We have been grappling with this burning image of the Supreme Court ever since.
Efforts to constrain the Justices' work through a medley of complicated customs, procedures, and interpretive theories reflect not only the view that judicial review is a potentially anti-democratic feature, but also the overpowering sense that a tied Court is a more perfect institution. 104 The Justices sometimes chafe against this ideal, more of the time they play to it, but always they must contend with its existence.
The frame of institutional strife invoked by the Court as a persuasive, organizing device in cases such as Dale and Velazquez revolves around the notion that Law is Order as surely as other features of our legal system. 105 Because the myth of judicial frailty is so fixed in the public consciousness, the archetype is readily manipulated by constitutional conversationalists. Deviations from the cognitive ideal of the bound judiciary are viewed as just that: aberrations. Like the New Testament God who has receded from daily life, in so many ways the Justices foster an image of the High Court as standing apart from human affairs, "intervening" in the social world only when it "must" do so. 106 This lasting image helps to make possible the role of the reluctant law-giver taken on by the Judiciary in pursuing social acceptance of its rulings.
We are surrounded by everyday incarnations of the bound authority figure-the term-limited President, the agrarian-soldier, the part-time local official. These historical and literary icons in our daily experiences, as much as the legal traditions directly bearing on American law, compose the background against which jurists cultivate popular perception of judicial duty, order, and care.
There are other idealized models, of course, running rampant through the case reporters, available to serve a constitutional actor on a moment's notice. The "one person, one vote" 107 ideal has driven much of voting rights law, even as it tells us nothing in particular about where a constitutional line should be drawn. Likewise, the mythic "sovereignty of the people" has been invoked in constitutional discourse since time immemorial by leading figures-from Publius to Brutus, from John Marshall to Robert Bork. 108 Though our instinct may be to deny it, symbols, images, archetypes, and shortcuts are endemic to how constitutional law is explained by tribunals and understood by a diverse citizenry. As one might expect, there is cause for both optimism and concern. Informal linguistic practices can, and have been, turned back upon existing institutions by the members of the public as they remake the lines of authority in each generation. At the same time, playing to cultural ideals about the Court can obscure the difficult substantive choices that are made, the counter-ideals suppressed-momentarily or for a longer spell-and the interpretive paths not taken.
V CONCLUSION
Awareness of bureaucratic dynamics and cognitive processes aids us in discerning the ways in which the Supreme Court behaves as a cultural institution. While the Rehnquist Court has demonstrated its skill with language in a number of ways, one recurring composition stands out from the crowd. The frame of institutional strife, examined here in recent free speech decisions, is an especially efficacious, though troubling, language device. Imaginatively invoking cultural ideals of restraint and order, this move creates psychic tension, identifies a culprit, repairs the breach, and in the process enhances the legitimacy of the Court. Order is ritually reestablished through the force and rhythm of the Justices' words, and through their engagement with memories of past conflict and the sensations of fear and uncertainty, comfort and stability.
There is much more work to be done in this vein. In an important sense, then, the turn toward the cognitive sciences is not an attempt to offer a programmatic vision of law's content, but a work in progress toward a descriptive methodology, one that exhibits a keen sensitivity to the intricate relationships between language, cognition, and state authority. If we isolate the rhetorics of power employed by our governing institutions, we can appreciate the full spectrum of legal language and experience its creative and vibrant qualities. One might even discover new patterns of judicial behavior. Linguistic tendencies provide clues about institutional motivations, doctrinal development, and the extent to which American culture influences legal thought.
In the final analysis, we should take care not to train our eyes so intently upon the explicit forms of argumentation in judicial writings that we discount seemingly nonessential language as decorous arrangements. Routine turns of phrase could play a critical mental "cuing" function. A potent metaphor or catchy saying might constitute, in the memorable words of Justice Robert Jackson, an "effective . . . shortcut from mind to mind" bringing to life the full force of legal authority.
